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* 
1. Overview 
The aim of this paper is simple: to define how the export of JHA principles and norms inform 
the geopolitical ambitions of the EU. By geopolitical, I refer broadly to the use of space for 
political purposes, that is, the control and management of people, objects and movement. As 
such, the paper is about ‘governmentality’, a concept I explain below. This paper is, in many 
ways, programmatic as the ENP is still in its infancy. Rather than reinventing the wheel by 
recounting the content of Action Plans on the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, I offer 
conceptual resources for understanding the content and rationales of the external dimension of 
EU Justice and Home Affairs (ED-JHA).
1 This is not an easy fix, however, because the task is 
complicated by the fact that there is an extraordinary variety of approaches that are assumed, or 
claim to bear on the ED-JHA (compare Kelley, 2006; Wolff, 2008; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004; Lavenex, 2004; Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005; Friis and Murphy, 1999). 
Theoretically, moreover, confusion arises because ED-JHA is not always carefully distinguished 
from EU foreign policy (see Smith and Webber, 2008, for an exception). In fact, although the 
ED-JHA is often treated as an instrument of EU external policy, it is best thought of as a 
distinctive policy, with its own raison d’être and mechanisms (cf. Emerson, 2004; Christiansen 
et al., 2000; Balzacq, 2007; Kaunert, 2005; Smith, 2006; Guild and Van Selm, 2005; Peers, 
2008; Cremona, 2004; Monar, 2000; Mounier et al., 2007). Finally, the literature in this field is 
growing so fast that the first challenge that confronts students is to sort out, within limits, the 
central features of the ED-JHA. In light of this, a framework that defines the substance and the 
logic of the ED-JHA is very much needed. This is what I attempt to provide here. 
Perhaps problematically, how to characterise the external action in the field of JHA separates 
students of EU politics (Léonard, 2006; Berthelet, 2007; Trauner, 2006; Wichmann, 2007). 
Despites their differences, however, what they strive to understand is essentially similar: how 
instruments primarily crafted for domestic purposes play out in non-member states. In other 
words, no matter the precise content of the policies, the challenge is to keep geographical 
borders relevant, while restructuring its effects on the normative divide between inside and 
outside (Pastore, 2001). However, the main trait of the external dimension is that it is 
constitutive of an increasing swathe of EU policies, which is reflected by the lack of agreement 
about the appropriate concept to use in order to capture the practices at work. This bears directly 
on some of the key puzzles in the vocabulary of the ED-JHA. Sarah Léonard (2006) underlines, 
for instance, that there are many labels attached to the external facet of EU policy in JHA, e.g.: 
externalisation, internationalisation, or external governance. In various instances, these concepts 
are used interchangeably with little, if any, theoretical justification. My claim is that, though 
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some of these concepts overlap considerably, each covers a set of peculiar practices and, for that 
matter, deserves at least brief scrutiny. Those who shy away from this task usually blur the 
rationale of ED-JHA, giving the impression that anything goes.  
To start with, externalisation means, in this context, that JHA provisions become part of the EU 
list of external affairs (Rijpma and Cremona, 2007). This is most apparent in the Council of the 
European Union (2000) document that sets out the “objectives for external relations in the field 
of Justice and Home Affairs.” In that text, externalisation means that JHA remains an 
independent policy domain, but the EU can, if it deems necessary, include specific policies in its 
external relations in order to safeguard internal security. Internationalisation, on the other hand, 
occurs when the EU acts as a distinctive polity and negotiates with third countries in matters 
that are traditionally regarded as falling within the precincts of internal politics. To use the 
parlance of Kenneth Waltz (1979), with great trepidation, the difference between externalisation 
and internationalisation depends on where the level of analysis is set. In short, externalisation 
accounts for second-level processes, while internationalisation speaks to third-level or systemic 
interactions.  
The last master concept used in the field is external governance. To my mind, external 
governance is but one specific outcome of internationalisation. Indeed, for the purpose of this 
paper, I define external governance as a cluster of processes by which an entity A regulates, 
manages or control the behaviour and, in certain circumstances, identities and interests of an 
entity B, in context C. This is why I think the term governmentality provides explanatory 
leeway in explaining what the ED-JHA does. To use Mitchell Dean’s words (1999, p. 23), 
governmentality covers four dimensions: “1. characteristic forms of visibility, ways of seeing 
and perceiving; 2. distinctive ways of thinking and questioning, relying on definite vocabularies 
and procedures for the production of truth…; 3. specific ways of acting, intervening and 
directing, made up of particular forms of practical rationality (‘expertise’ and ‘know-how’), and 
relying upon definite mechanisms, techniques, and technologies; and 4. characteristic ways of 
forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents.” It follows that extra-territorialisation, 
another concept often used in the domain of JHA, is an avatar of external governance (Rodier, 
2006).  Extra-territorialisation is best illustrated in the works of those who examine the 
practices of ‘remote control’, that is, EU control of border management as it is carried out far 
beyond hard material limits (Bigo and Guild, 2005; Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001). However, 
extra-territoriality need not be linked, exclusively, to policies that aim to curb threats 
(Wichmann, 2008). In fact, extra-territorialisation, as the other concepts discussed here, could 
be equally applied to the overall domain of JHA, to the extent that the level at which the EU is 
working – internal or external – is taken into account.  
The decisive point of the above discussion is that the ED-JHA aims to step up international 
security by strengthening the resources and abilities of third countries, to act in the field of 
security, including border management. Thus, it is the central tenet of the external dimension 
that security is relational, and that the EU will be better off via intensive cooperation, that is, 
“mutual adjustment in policy that improves (its) welfare” (Lake, 1999, p. 25; Keohane, 1984). 
This view of cooperation differs from a neoliberal account that predicts that cooperation 
delivers, by any means, absolute gains to the partners involved in the process (see Baldwin, 
1993). I argue that this need not be the case. On the contrary, it might even produce less security 
for one of the partners while increasing, somewhat paradoxically, the density of interactions 
among actors comprising the relationship. Therefore the results of cooperation rarely coincide 
with the planned objectives and might, on different occasions, yield considerable indirect 
effects.   
It is held, for instance, that JHA provisions contained in ENP Action Plans aim to establish an 
inclusive security framework. In the literature, however, there is a wide recognition that the THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU J & HA | 3 
 
ENP framework is set on, and inevitably reproduces, a relation that is considerably asymmetric 
(Tassinari, 2005; Balzacq, 2007). Following David Lake (1999, p. 24-31), asymmetric security 
relationships are defined as interactions in which one of the partners (of a dyad) possesses a 
quantum of ‘residual control’ over the other. The production of security in an asymmetric 
cooperation pattern often takes two forms, empire and informal empire models. In an empire, 
Lake (1999, p. 28) assumes, “two polities are melded together in a hierarchic relationship in 
which one party controls the other.” An informal empire displays a form of hierarchy, too, but 
departs from an empire on one essential account: the control exerted by the dominant partner 
does not prevent it from building ties with third countries even though the content of those 
interactions might be influenced by the external authority. In other words, an informal empire 
produces compliance through specific mechanisms of control, management or regulation in a 
chosen functional area (Lake, 1999, p. 31; Zielonka, 2007).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. I begin by investigating how the ENP reconfigures 
the ED-JHA, through a peculiar approach to borders/identities and borders/orders articulations. 
This helps me to identify and separate out the major elements of the ED-JHA, which call up a 
distinctive mode of management, termed governance. We will then be in a position to discuss 
conceptual stances on the governance of the ED-JHA. Specifically, I argue that among the many 
ways of analysing governance, three intellectual traditions – institutionalism, constructivism, 
and policy instruments – are best suited for understanding the processes at work in the ED-JHA. 
Finally, I trace the evolution of the ED-JHA, emphasising, whenever possible, continuities and 
bifurcations. Overall, the aim is to ascertain the extent to which conceptual designs clarify or 
advances our knowledge of the contents and rationales of the ED-JHA.  
2.  Borders, Security Externalities, Governance 
In May 2004, the Commission presented its project on the ENP. Cut to the bone, the ENP has 
three main objectives: enhancing co-operation in the political field as well as in security matters 
and social-economic development in a way that is distinct from EU membership (Commission 
of the European Union, 2004). There are 16 countries involved – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine – which suggests that rather than being a 
policy stripped of any ambition, as claimed by some sceptics, the ENP aims to design new 
relationships with countries of different political cultures, on a wide range of topics. It is not, by 
any means, an easy task to define such a policy particularly when one needs to reconcile the 
aims of external relations with those of JHA. On the one hand, openness – including a degree of 
liberalisation of movement of persons from the neighbouring countries in view of reinforcing 
good neighbourly relations – is called for, while on the other hand, the need to strictly 
implement the Schengen acquis on border controls and visa regimes is emphasised. One major, 
and persistent, challenge for eastern and southern neighbours is how to convince the EU that 
they can be good partners in complying with the objectives of Schengen by cooperating with the 
EU in controls on who crosses the EU external borders (Andreas, 2003, pp. 102-07).  
If we are interested in the ED-JHA as it relates to ENP, then we have to take stock of border 
processes. Borders naturally have material (i.e., they separate inside from outside) and cognitive 
(i.e., they distinguish us and them) functions (cf. Agnew, 1998; Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; 
O’Tuathail, 1996; Walker, 1993; Dalby, 1991; Anderson, 1996; Berg and Ehin 2006). Most 
ENP scholarship, proponents and critics alike, concur that border management is a fundamental 
policy at which EU concerns with identity and order intersect (compare Smith, 2006; Tassinari, 
2005; Raik, 2006). Under this heading, I briefly discuss what is called, in Yosef Lapid’s (1996, 
pp. 10-5) words, “borders-to-identities” and “borders-to-orders” sequences. I do not take up 
opposite sequences (i.e., identities-to-borders and orders-to-borders) as I believe they do not 4 | THIERRY BALZACQ 
 
quite exemplify what is at stake in ED-JHA. To my mind, the design of EU borders seems to 
predate the emergence of a specific EU identity, as order presupposes a reliable ‘dispositif’ of 
border management (e.g., surveillance technologies, police training, operational cooperation, 
joint patrols, data sharing).
2  
2.1  Borders and identities 
Although debates on identity are rarely explicit in EU policies, a closer scrutiny of discursive 
practices seem to reveal that identity, in the sense of a constitutive ‘we’, matters more than often 
thought (Rieker, 2004). For instance, asked by the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee whether Ukraine could qualify for EU membership, Gunther Verheugen (1999) 
retorted “I think that anybody who thinks that Ukraine should be taken in the EU…should 
perhaps come along with the argument that Mexico should be taken into the US” (cited in 
Primatarova, 2005, p.33). This is probably overstated and history might, sooner or later, 
contradict the former Commissioner. Nonetheless, the analogy with the US-Mexico relationship 
has the virtue of tabling questions of identities in the EU-neighbours’ relationships, despite a 
strong geographic contiguity. Yet the ultimate aim of the ENP, as Romano Prodi (2002) points 
out, is to “extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which 
define the very essence of the European Union” (emphasis added). In other words, the 
constitutive identity of the EU is decisively normative. Yet, the fact that neighbours think and 
behave according to the EU templates, does not license them to membership.  
This position might sound inconsistent, but for the EU it is not. It is argued, indeed, that the 
ENP pursues distinctive objectives, but uses the same tools as those of enlargement, including 
learning and socialisation, conditionality, and benchmarking (Kelley, 2006). Even though 
neighbours could develop a form of complex learning of EU norms and standards, which affects 
their identities and interests, they remain different. Thus, the challenge for the ENP is to 
accommodate “the extension of the legal boundaries of authority” to the relatively static 
material limits of the EU (Lavenex, 2004, p. 686). This is a tall order, and sceptics would argue 
that EU borders are not at all static; they would claim, instead, that EU borders are flexible, and 
in constant flux. Point taken; but my purpose is not to question the fact that EU borders might 
move, or that the regime of EU borders might vary, from one point of entry to another. Far from 
it. For a neighbourhood policy to exist there needs to be two separate polities. This necessarily 
raises, in turn, problems of identities and differences that students of EU politics should grapple 
with seriously, not dismiss out of hand.  
2.2  Borders and orders 
To paraphrase Michel Foucault (1967), the greatest anxiety of the EU is with space. In this 
context, the EU policy is to establish common standards with regard to border management at 
the Union's external borders to enable thus an area of freedom, security and justice without 
control at internal borders for persons, whatever their nationality, within the EU (Higashino, 
2004; Kirchner and Sperling, 2000). This needs to be seen in a wider context and it covers 
aspects of international cooperation as this is indispensable to ensure the smooth running of the 
system, particularly concerning activities in and arrangements with countries of origin and 
transit, whereby the focus is first on the issuing of visa and other consular issues as well as 
readmission/return matters (dialogue on migration and asylum). There is, moreover, the 
technical border cooperation with neighbouring countries (e.g. new neighbours in the East) as 
well as traditional trading and political partnerships (e.g. the US and Canada), the intention of 
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which is to enhance security but also to create a smoother system of managing borders and 
anticipating problems (Smith, 1996). 
However, EU territoriality – “the attempt to…affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, 
and relationships by delineating and asserting control over a geographic area” – is as mutable as 
its boundaries (Sack, 1986, p.19). In fact, rather than simply broadening the limits of EU, as it is 
often assumed, each round of enlargement reactivates, or redistributes, border management 
priorities. Thus, the 2004 enlargement brought into sharp focus EU relations with its 
neighbours. As Christopher Patten and Javier Solana (2002) put it, “decisions on 
enlargement…will bring the duel challenge of avoiding new dividing lines in Europe while 
responding to needs arising from the newly created borders of the Union.” It is therefore urgent, 
so the argument goes, that “we…fully exploit the new opportunities created by enlargement to 
develop relations with our neighbours.” In this approach, “stability, prosperity, shared values 
and rule of law along (EU) borders are all fundamental for (its) security. Failure in any of these 
areas will lead to increased risks of negative spillover on the Union.” In other words, the ENP 
strives, primarily, to curb “negative externalities” stemming from the 2004 enlargement (Grant, 
2006).
3 The figure below might be useful in understanding the challenge confronting the Union. 
Figure 1. Europe’s neighbourhood and its regions 
 
Source: Tassinari, 2005. 
Our interest in borders-to-orders and borders-to-identities sequences should not preclude equally 
decisive intersections, namely order-to-identity, and vice-versa. In security studies, these 
intersections have been examined by students of societal security (Buzan et al., 1990; 
McSweeney, 1999). Identities/orders intersections are important for the ENP partly because a 
sustainable political order requires some kind of collective identity, and partly because change 
                                                      
3 David Lake (1997, p. 49) defines externalities as “costs (negative externalities) and benefits (positive 
externalities) that do not accrue only to the actors that create them. They are also known as spillover or 
neighbourhood affects.” 
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in the latter often alters political order. The converse is true (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999; 
Hall, 1999; Neumann, 1999). But there are degrees in collective identity formation. It takes two 
important forms, a pluralistic security community, on the one hand, and integration, on the 
other. Barry Buzan (1983, p.190) captures this in one generic term, security complexes, i.e., “a 
group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their 
national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” At base, pluralist 
security communities and integration enjoy quite the same level of security as their collective 
identity commits members to the non-use of military force, inviolability of borders, as well as 
an increase in transboundary interactions (Morgan, 1997, p.37).  
However, integration goes a step further. It happens when a group of states pool their efforts 
together, across different sectors, and create a new internal political sphere. In this light, the 
level of practice shifts too; in fact, while pluralist security communities operate at the systemic 
level, integration works at the domestic level (Morgan, 1997, p.38). Inevitably, therefore, this 
leads us to the view that the ENP aims to set up a regional pluralist security community. That 
system is called regional because it refers to a “set of states affected by at least one transborder 
but local externality that emanates from a particular geographic area” (Lake, 1997, p. 49). Thus, 
the ED-JHA is regarded as an attempt by the EU to “expand its sphere of governance in 
particular in areas which have become securitized inside and where vulnerability is attributed to 
developments in the third countries in question” (Lavenex, 2004, p. 686). It is this concept of 
governance and the intellectual resources it triggers, that inform the next section. 
3.  Theoretical Approaches to Governance and their Limits 
The concept of governance is elastic (cf. Rhodes, 2007; Evans, 1995; Peters, 1996; Pierre and 
Peters, 2000; Pierre, 2000). In fact, either as a theory or a framework, governance is used in 
different settings, for various purposes and as such generally triggers distinctive understandings 
of issues on which it is brought to bear (Self, 1996; Weiss, 1998). Typically, contributions to the 
literature on governance can be articulated around two classes of studies. While the first 
examines ways of marking out governance from government, the second class turns the arrows 
of explanation in another direction, to focus on different theoretical approaches to governance. 
However, most studies now do both, by linking critical analysis on the transformation of modes 
of government to conceptual discussions about governance as an alternative to, or an 
instantiation of changes in government functioning (see Webber, 2007).  
Thus, my task in this section is straightforward: I define the concept of governance and 
delineate its features as they relate to the issue of security. To do this, I document important 
approaches to governance and compare, or better contrast them to the cognate, but radical 
concept, of governmentality. Three theories of governance often regarded as essential in 
grasping the external processes of EU internal security are institutionalism, constructivism and 
policy instrument analysis. Each explores governance through a distinctive lens, highlighting 
some facets, while ignoring others. The aim is to arrive at a coherent, complex but tractable 
concept of governance, one which could help students come to terms with the rationales and 
functions of the external dimension of EU-JHA.  
3.1  What is governance? 
This question preoccupies those who examine the substantive aspect of governance; the thrust 
being to glean the defining features of governance. For instance, Andrew Gamble (2000, p.110) 
defines governance as: “the steering capacities of a political system without making any 
assumption as to which institution or agents make the steering”. In the same vein, Elke 
Krahmann (2003, p.11), in an attempt to capture the emerging architecture of transatlantic THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU J & HA | 7 
 
security, postulates that: “governance denotes the structure and processes which enable a set of 
public and private actors to coordinate their independent needs and interests through the making 
and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority.” 
Further, Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham (1994, p.78), in a way that echoes Michel Foucault, 
describe governance as really a combination of three things: “1) ‘government’, as in the rule of 
a nation-state, a region, or municipal area; 2) ‘self-government’, as in control of own emotions 
and behaviour; and 3) ‘governor’, as in devices fitted to machines to regulate their energy intake 
and hence control or manage their performance.”
4 Finally, Emil J. Kirchner (2006) reaches a 
similar conclusion, but draws on different sources. In this context, government is pitted against 
governance. While the former concentrates on the Weberian view of a centralised authority able 
to impose its will on the society to achieve planned objectives, the latter emphasises, by 
contrast: “how the regulation of societies or the international system has come to involve 
political actors aside from governments.” In any case, governance is not a closed theoretical 
system, but rather designates a wide set of methods to regulate, control or manage ‘known’ 
entities (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, p.79).  
3.2  Theories of governance 
Conceptual approaches to governance differ in the status they accord to specific actors, factors 
or processes. This is not to claim, however, that theories of governance are incompatible, though 
some will be relevant to understanding certain types of phenomena, and not others. In fact, 
constructivism has been mostly used by students of EU integration, whereas institutionalism has 
been taken up by those who examine how different EU bodies operate. By contrast, policy tools 
remain largely unexplored – theoretically, though not in substance. In this section, however, I 
argue that governance is conceptually agnostic and that each approach has something to tell us 
about the ED-JHA. 
3.2.1 Institutionalism 
Generally, approaches that fall under this heading combine, though in various guises, rationalist 
and constructivist premises. In particular, they raise two kinds of difficult questions, what 
counts as an institution and, more importantly, what impact, if any, do institutions have on the 
structure and outcome of political action? Those who study institutions argue that “through the 
development of specific competencies, organisations can potentially transform agendas and 
goals” and that “these entities can function as creators of meaning and identities” (Simmons and 
Martin, 2002, p.193). In short, institutions are “political actors in their own right” (March and 
Olsen, 1984, p.738). 
The problem with this perspective, however, is that students of institutionalism rarely agree 
about the adequate definition of institutions. In fact, any new definition of institutions, it is held, 
will very likely suffer from the same defects as those that are said to cripple previous attempts. 
To a certain extent, notwithstanding, it is now admitted, but for a few exceptions (Keohane, 
1983), that institutions are: “sets of rules meant to govern international behaviour” (Simmons 
and Martin, 2002, p.194; see also Mearsheimer, 1994/95). Beth Simmons and Lisa Martin 
observe that this definition presents three advantages, at least. To start with, in contrast to 
definitions of regime that dominated IR’s understanding of institutions in the 1980s, this 
definition is parsimonious, and only includes the constitutive features of institutions. Moreover, 
it does not conflate institutions and organisations, as some informal institutions are not 
embodied by a visible organisation. Finally, this definition clearly delineates what an institution 
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is from what it does. In sum, Simmons and Martin (2002, p. 194) conclude, that this 
specification “allows for the systematic evaluation of a broad range of theoretical claims using a 
single definition of institutions.” 
According to Peters (1999, p. 149), institutionalism is a “broad, if variegated, approach”. In this 
light, it would be preposterous to attempt to discuss all the families of institutionalisms on offer. 
I focus therefore on what has come to be regarded as a classical typology. Peter Hall and 
Rosemary Taylor (1996) propose three broad views of institutional analysis: rational choice, 
sociological and historical institutionalisms. The first, rational choice institutionalism, insists on 
material incentives as constraints for action. In this light, it is held that actors are but susceptible 
to simple learning, that which transforms their behaviours, not their identities or interests (see 
Shepsle and Weingast, 1995). Contrary to constructivism, which assumes that organisation “can 
become autonomous sites of authority”, rational choice institutionalism claims that 
organisations are instruments purposefully used by actors for their own best interests and, 
“unless a net gain resulted from membership”, so the argument goes, “members would not join 
(or remain in the club)” (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, p. 707). In this approach, governance 
primarily consists of manipulating incentives in order to increase the net values or pursuing 
cooperation in a given form, within a specific context.  
Sociological institutionalism focuses on the production of meaning by institutions. In the 
literature today, this view is associated with cognitive approaches to institutions, whereby “what 
a creature does is, in large part, a function of the creator’s representation of its environment” 
(d’Andrade, 1984, p. 88). To reduce uncertainty actors set up a common framework that helps 
them to assign meaning to situations and to new actors they encounter. Finally, historical 
institutionalism builds a synthetic argument on the relation between action and institutions, by 
putting together rational choice and sociological insights. In brief, it is premised upon the idea 
that current decisions and actions are affected by the initial conditions under which institutions 
were crafted. 
There is nothing in this section to suggest that any of the institutionalist strands ‘takes it all’. In 
fact, it seems obvious today that students of institutionalism are question-driven rather than 
school-driven. What determines whether one strand is emphasised over another is at base 
empirical relevance. In a compelling paper, Fearon and Wendt (2002) show that assumptions 
upon which various kinds of institutionalism dwell – i.e. rationalism and constructivism – are 
not as incompatible as often held. Perhaps, in this light, the most promising route for students of 
the ED-JHA is to determine the extent to which a priori emphasis on any of the approaches to 
institutionalism affects the questions they ask and inevitably the results they reach.  
3.2.2 Constructivism 
While rational choice institutionalism begins with exogenous identities and interests that govern 
the use of institutions, constructivism starts, by contrast, from endogenous identities and 
interests that emerge, evolve and change through interactions among actors, on the one hand, 
and between actors and institutions, on the other (cf. Onuf, 1989; Kratochwil, 1989; Finnemore, 
1993, 1996; Legro, 1997). When applied to the study of norms, institutions appear as “chief 
socializing agents” that constrain “targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws, and to ratify 
treaties…” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.902). Taking a different tack, Alexander Wendt 
explores the ontological form of institutions. This leads him to argue that institutions are “a 
structure of identity and interest” (Wendt 1992, p.399). This definition is simple, but potentially 
strong. Taking this position on institutions implies, first, that they are essentially stable entities, 
material or not. In this view, moreover, institutions that embody characteristic identities and 
interests are contextual in the sense that they reflect specific ways of being, and distinctive THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU J & HA | 9 
 
preferences about what deserves to be pursued. The ultimate question, therefore, is whose 
interests and identities do institutions exemplify or promote?  
The answer, of course, is not as simple as one might think, as it goes deep into the intentionality 
of institutions, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Whatever the posture one adopts, 
notwithstanding, the purposes of institutions in terms of governance is to create the conditions 
for a viable collective security, by transforming the meaning of interactions, from individualism 
to a security community of sorts. These insights find considerable support in the ENP, the aim 
of which is to set out a cooperative system of security, through new intersubjective meanings. 
Before it does anything else security governance aims to create the processes conducive to a 
system of cooperative security. This carries us into Wendt’s continuum of security. Crucially, 
the most general proposition is that collective identity formation depends, at least in principle, 
as much on structural contexts as it does on systemic and strategic practices.  
Structural contexts. Interaction dynamics are the basis of the construction of intersubjective 
structures in international relations. For constructivists, systemic structures are built from 
common social knowledge and shared understandings. Moreover, the nature of anarchy is 
determined by the nature of the intersubjective structure that actors build. In turn, collective 
identity created by these intersubjective understandings can either be exclusive in the sense that 
actors forsake previous social structures and carve out new ones, or inclusive, when a powerful 
state coerces weaker states to adopt its identity (see Prodi, 2002). In this case, actors find 
themselves in a collective hegemonic identity à la Gramsci (Wendt, 1994, p.389).  
Systemic processes. Wendt (ibid.) defines systemic processes as “dynamic in the external 
context of state action.” Two systemic processes are discussed: interdependence and the 
transnational convergence of domestic values. The first can take two forms, the “dilemma of 
common interest” created by an increase in the “dynamic density” and the “dilemma of common 
aversion” produced by the emergence of a threatening ‘common other’. Whatever the form 
taken by interdependence, it pursues the same aim, i.e. to render actors less inclined to unilateral 
activities and increase the “incentive to identify with others” (Ibid.). The second systemic 
process highlighted by Wendt is called societal or transnational convergence. It has at least two 
different sources, interdependence and demonstration effects (e.g., diffusion and lesson-
drawing). The core effect of the transnational convergence of domestic values (cultural, 
economical, political, etc.) is to reduce the heterogeneity among actors who, as a consequence, 
gradually develop the consciousness that others are neither so different, nor as threatening as 
they might be. In this light, a constructivist reading would argue that one of the decisive 
objectives of the ENP is to arrive at a desecuritised relationship between neighbours and the EU 
(see Tassinari, 2005). 
Strategic practice. This refers to a form of interaction in which: “others are assumed to be 
purposive agents with whom one is interdependent.” (Wendt, 1994, p. 390). Here, Wendt tries 
to depart from rationalist propositions on cooperation. The analytical bite of rationalism, it can 
be argued, is that strategic interactions are able to change patterns of behaviour, but identities 
and interests remain fixed during interactions. Thus, Wendt draws a distinction between 
behavioural and rhetorical interaction. One kind of behavioural practice is that of altercasting, 
that is, a: “technique of interactor control in which ego uses tactics of self-presentation and stage 
management in an attempt to frame alter’s definitions of social situations in ways that create the 
role which ego desires alter to play.” (Wendt, 1992, p.421; 1999, p.346). In short, cooperative 
interactions enable actors to present themselves in a new light while internalising new beliefs 
about others and selves. 
In the second sense, constructivism assumes, interactions are rhetorical (Balzacq, forthcoming). 
How should we understand this? Rhetorical practices are conscious symbolic practices 
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strategic environment. They can take different forms, including multilateral dialogues, symbolic 
actions or signals. The content of rhetorical practices can vary, too. It could either be a 
securitising move (as in the case of illegal migration), or a de-securitisation move (as in the case 
of integration). However, rhetorical and behavioural practices are very close. For instance, 
altercasting can be implemented both through discursive mediations and symbolic works. What 
stands out here is that, in any account, the outcome of strategic practices depends on the 
meaning ascribed to the linguistic categorisation of pedagogic codes (Bernstein, 1971). 
Specifically, codes can be either restricted or extended. They are restricted if language is 
contextualised in a dyadic relationship that presupposes a tacit shared background knowledge. 
On the other hand, codes are extended if actors linguistically interact without having a 
significant degree of tacit background assumptions shared with others. The first case is more 
open to genuine symbolic exchange than the second. Thus, the construction of Action Plans, 
which are negotiated between the EU and its partners, aims to design a common knowledge of 
issues at hand in order to carve out convergent policies. 
The above discussion – on causal factors offered by Wendt in order to understand the internal 
process of collective identity formation amongst states – structural contexts, systemic processes, 
and strategic practice, can be summarised as follows: 
Table 1. A summary of Wendt’s model of collective identity formation 
CAUSAL FACTORS  FORMS  SOURCES  EFFECTS 
Behavioural 
•  Self-presentation 
•  Altercasting  STRATEGIC PRACTICES 
Rhetorical  •  Discursive symbols 
Change the image of 
the self and the other 
within a strategic 
environment 
Interdependence 
•  Density of interaction 
•  Common Other 
Reduce the egoistic 
attitude 
SYSTEMIC PROCESSES 
Societal 
convergence 
•  Interdependence 
•  Demonstration effort, 
diffusion, lesson drawing 
Reduce the 
heterogeneity 
amongst actors 
STRUCTURAL CONTEXT  Intersubjective 
structures 
•  Social knowledge, 
•  Shared meanings and 
expectations 
Gives meaning to 
material structures 
 
3.2.3 Policy  instruments 
A third set of general approaches to the question of governance emphasises the ‘life cycle’ of 
policy instruments – choice, function, and effects (Balzacq, 2008). One tension within the 
literature concerns the relative focus on the ‘neutral’ efficiency of instruments. To put my cards 
on the table, my view of tools is compatible with the precepts of critical theory (Wyn Jones, 
1999). In fact, a tool approach to governance should not be equated with an instrumental view 
of a policy, which holds that policy tools are: “subservient to values established in other social 
spheres – political and cultural” (Feenberg, 1991, p.5).  
To demonstrate the utility of a tool approach to governance, I proceed in two steps. First, I 
delineate the boundaries of a policy tool and discuss its central features. Second, I examine 
types of tools that embody these traits, by stressing how each shapes our understanding of 
governance. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU J & HA | 11 
 
3.2.4 Of  instruments:  definition and key features 
What, then, is an instrument or a tool of public action? Given the range of definitions, 
connotations and degrees of abstraction, a useful first step may be to outline more precisely 
what an instrument is not. First, an instrument is not a programme. In general, a programme 
comprises one or more tools that it mobilises in specific circumstances. This means that a single 
tool can be brought to bear on particular fields or problems by different programmes. If this 
perspective is credible, one could perhaps argue that a tool is more general than a programme. 
Second, and more significantly, a tool is not a policy. Typically, policies are more general than 
tools as they are primarily: “collections of programmes operating on a similar field or aimed at 
some general objective” (Salamon, 2002, p.20).  
The confusion between these elements – i.e. programme and policy – has long obstructed 
concrete definition. This accords with the extant variety and somewhat multifaceted aspects of 
artefacts labelled tools within the governance literature. Generally, definitions reproduce a 
neutral approach to policy tools. For instance, Hoogerwerf (1989, p.4) codes instruments as: 
“everything that an actor uses or could potentially use to aid in the attainment of one or more 
goals” (Hoogerwerf, 1989, p.4). This is not always so. In fact, more nuanced approaches 
postulate that instruments can be grasped either as objects or as activities (de Bruijn and Hufen, 
1998, pp. 13-4). In the first sense, instruments are tangible, that is, mostly material phenomena. 
By contrast, as practices, instruments are: “a collection of policy activities that show similar 
characteristics focused on influencing and governing social purposes” (Ringeling, 1983, p.1). 
This distinction is coherent and useful, but it is incomplete. For instance, it does not allow for a 
synthetic understanding of instruments. Thus, the precise meaning of instruments remains 
underspecified. The reason for this is not hard to find. Indeed, certain instruments that are 
traditionally regarded as objects have, on closer scrutiny, the main endogenous features of 
activities (Hood, 1983). FRONTEX, the body set up to coordinate member states’ operational 
cooperation to secure the EU’s external borders is, for example, not so much an object as a set 
of activities and processes. Given this caveat, I define a tool or an instrument of governance as 
an identifiable social and technical ‘dispositif’ or device embodying a specific image of ‘social 
reality’ through which public action is configured in order to address a issue (Lascoumes and 
Le Galès, 2004, p.13; Linder and Peters, 1984; Salamon, 2002, p.19). This definition, imperfect 
as it may be, offers three basic characteristics of instruments of governance.  
First, each instrument has defining features that align it with others, and design traits that make 
it unique or, at least, differentiate it from others. For instance, all JHA databases require the 
collection, storage and exchange of information, but they differ significantly in the nature of 
information they hold, the duration of the storage, and the conditions under which their data can 
be retrieved. Second, tools configure actions, in the sense that each instrument “has its own 
operating procedures, skills requirements, and delivering mechanisms, indeed its own ‘political 
economy’” (Salamon, 2002, p.2). What is involved here, moreover, is the idea that tools are 
institutions of sorts. According to this view, they are a routine set of rules and procedures that 
structure the interactions among individuals and organisations. In short, policy tools can 
configure social relations in decisive ways. In this respect, by their very nature, tools “define 
who is involved in the operation of public programmes, what their roles are, and how they relate 
to each other” (Salamon, 2002, p.19). In other words, governance instruments reconfigure what 
is called public action, the aim of which is to address issues identified as targets of public 
action. Third, and finally, policy tools embody a specific image of the partners and, to a large 
extent, what ought to be done about them. In this respect, the ENP categorises partners and 
commands a particular method of dealing with them (through control, management, 
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Thus, the policy instruments of governance do not represent a purely technical solution to a 
public problem. Of course, the operational – i.e. technical – character of a governance 
instrument has to be adequately linked to a specific issue that it intends to address. However, a 
narrow focus on the operational aspect of governance tools neglects two crucial features of 
instruments, namely the political and symbolic elements. On the one hand, they are 
fundamentally political. Both the selection and use, as well as the effects of governance 
instruments depend on political factors and, in turn, require political mobilisation (Peters, 1998, 
p.552). It should thus be kept in mind that while governance tools might have technical 
attributes, the reason they are chosen, how they operate, evolve, and what their consequences 
are cannot simply be reduced to the technical particulars of the instruments. On the other hand, 
there are symbolic attributes built into policy instruments: “that (tell) the population what the 
(EU) is thinking…and what its collective perception of problems (is)” (Peters and van Nispen, 
1998, p.3). In other words, the focus on the political and symbolic aspects of governance 
instruments will lend an imaginative leap into a more robust conceptualisation of how “the 
intention of policy could be translated into operational activities” (de Bruijn and Hufen, 1998, p. 
12). Seen from this perspective, the most important implication is that governance policy tools 
relate to complex attributes of instruments. To use Salamon’s words (2002, p.20), a tool is a 
‘package’ that is made up of four different elements: 
•  A type of good or activity (e.g. the provision of information, training, surveillance). 
•  A delivery vehicle for this good or activity (e.g. media, electronic devices). 
•  A delivery system, that is, a set of organisations that are engaged in providing the good, 
service, or activity (e.g. an agency, air carriers, a Directorate General). 
•  A set of rules, whether formal or informal, defining the relationship among the entities that 
comprise the delivery system (e.g. the EU Directive on the retention of telecommunication 
data). 
It follows therefore that knowledge of governance instruments and their attributes reflects 
something of the problem to which public action is meant to respond. Further, it reveals policy 
preferences and the direction of action. In spite of basic similar attributes, each governance tool 
has different effects. To be sure, different tools are not equally effective in all cases. Indeed, 
securitisation instruments can sometimes have limited consequences or indirect effects. It 
becomes obvious therefore that the function of an instrument has a major impact on governance. 
That function depends, itself, on the nature of the tool. 
3.2.5  Types of instruments 
Attempts to classify policy instruments are quite common in public policy literature (Hood, 
1983; Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004, pp. 357-63; Schneider and Ingram, 1990; van Nispen and 
Ringeling, 1998, pp. 204-17). There is no shortage of typologies. This is mainly due to the fact 
that students of public action use distinct dimensions in order to compare and contrast tools. 
Christopher Hood (1983), for example, focuses on two key dimensions: (1) the role of the 
government by whom they are used; and (2) the government resources they enlist (such as 
organisation, authority). From a different theoretical perspective, Lorraine McDonnell and 
Richard Elmore (1987) sort instruments in terms of the strategy of intervention that 
governments use, leading to four types of tool: mandates, capacity-building, system changing, 
and inducements. Still based essentially on the kind of government intervention, Frans van der 
Doelen (1989) divides tools into three distinct families: the legal, the communication, and the 
economic families. Finally, Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram (1990) produce a fivefold 
classification emphasising behaviours that tools seek to change: authority, incentive, capacity, 
symbolic and learning tools. In the extreme, of course, this diversity may sound enigmatic. It THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU J & HA | 13 
 
should not be. To be sure, each classification tries to capture different facets of policy 
instruments. 
Regulatory Instruments. Those who choose to capture governance in terms of tools will find that 
regulatory instruments are among the most common techniques used by the EU to achieve its 
security objectives (e.g. Action Plans, Commission Communication, Council Declaration, 
Directives, Framework Decisions). The starting-point here is that regulatory tools seek to 
‘normalise’ the behaviour of target partners. Policy instruments thus aim to influence the 
behaviours of social actors by permitting certain practices to reduce the threat; by prohibiting 
some types of political activities; by promoting learning to impart perceptions. Moreover, that 
which makes regulatory instruments so attractive is that they often provide the framework 
within which both incentive and capacity tools operate. The main problem with regulatory tools, 
however, is that they require monitoring and enforcement, which provokes high management 
costs that the EU is unable, at this stage, to handle. For instance, the European Evidence 
Warrant foreseen by the Hague Programme (2004) in order to improve judicial cooperation for 
obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters has produced, 
mainly due to an incapacitating lack of trust, a deceptively trivial agreement that satisfies 
neither the EU Commission, nor the majority of member states. 
Incentive Instruments. In contrast to regulatory tools, incentives are typically non-coercive. 
Much contemporary incentive approaches to instruments premises upon the simple rationalist 
assumption that social actors are utility maximizers: put simply, they will only purposively 
select policy-relevant actions that are in their own best interests. The view taken by Ingram and 
Schneider identifies the main categories of incentives tools. They posit: “the incentive category 
includes tools that rely on tangible payoffs, positive or negatives to induce compliance….” This 
formulation is robust, not least because it assumes that social actors “will not be positively 
motivated to take policy-relevant action unless they are influenced, encouraged, or coerced by 
manipulation of money, liberty, life, or other tangible payoffs” (Ingram and Schneider, 1990, 
pp. 513-15). The EU uses, in particular, two types of incentive tools. The first of these is the 
inducement tools, that is, a set of positive payoffs to stimulate participation in policy-relevant 
activities. On the other hand, the EU is increasingly imposing penalties on actors who refuse to 
cooperate, or rather comply. Both tools are strongly associated with the ENP, whereby partners 
that meet standards of cooperation set in the Action Plans are offered rewards. In fact, the EU 
uses incentives (e.g. trade agreements, development aid) that aim to reduce resistances and 
encourage partners to respond positively (e.g. tighten border control, sign readmission 
agreements with the EU, host Europol liaison officers). Surely, inducement and sanctions are, 
obviously, substitute means. However, they do not produce the same net utility for the EU. In 
this situation, the main challenge for the EU is to calibrate inducements so that sanctions are no 
longer applicable as the inducement is strong enough.  
Capacity Tools. These are the most contentious tools of the EU neighbourhood strategy; yet 
they are the most preferred. In simple terms, capacity tools often call for enablement skills, that 
is, skills that allow individuals, groups and agencies to make decisions and carry out activities, 
which have a reasonable probability of success (Ingram and Schneider 1990, p.517). In this 
sense, capacity tools include, inter alia, information, training, force, and other resources 
necessary to the attainment of policy purposes (e.g. the budget). Thus, Abdelkrim Belguendouz 
(2005) observes that there has been an increase in the budget allocated to border management, 
thereby shifting the original priorities of the MEDA programme. In other words, capacity tools 
are useful devices if one is to trace the endogenous transformations of a policy, some of which 
evade linguistic articulation. It is important to highlight, moreover, that I am hereby concerned 
with ‘external’ tools, that is, tools that are mobilised to affect social actors. These tools are 14 | THIERRY BALZACQ 
 
naturally opposed to internal ones, which aim to lubricate the internal working of the EU.
5 
Finally, capacity instruments are hardly stable. EU databases, for example, are always under 
pressure to adopt new protocols and practices, to extend their functions, and to mobilise new 
resources to attend to the transformations of what is perceived as a precarious environment.  
To summarise, I have shown that there are various ways of understanding governance, and that 
each underlines distinctive characteristics of the latter. I did not, however, mean to argue that 
these positions were incommensurable; nor are they reducible, one to another. Instead, the 
richness of the theoretical traditions on governance testifies to the incredible diversity of 
practices at play, which constitutes, in my view, the ultimate focus of analysis.  
The next section is not, therefore, committed to a particular ‘school’ of governance. Instead, it 
draws freely on different currents of thought reviewed above. In doing so, I am more concerned 
with the empirical relevance of conceptual frameworks than with their aesthetic theoretical 
designs. This, I think, has often been very distracting to students of social sciences of various 
theoretical persuasions. Thus, the section traces, briefly, the genealogy of the external 
dimension, outlining, whenever possible, the competing rationales that shape it. The thrust is to 
underline the institutionalisation of the external dimension, discuss its logics, and examine its 
effects on the evolution of EU relations with its neighbours. 
4.  The Formation of ED-JHA 
Telling the story of the field can take a variety of forms, but the most common is temporal and 
linear (see Berthelet, 2007; Léonard, 2006). This strategy presents both a strength and a 
weakness. The strength is that one has to compile the most important dates and discuss the 
content of documents produced thereof. The weakness is that students of JHA very rarely agree 
on whether a given moment is important or not, leaving it to the sheer judgement of the analyst. 
Yet, even the weakness offers me a window, as I draw the lesson that listing a catalogue of dates 
is less important than tracing the stakes at work within the developments of the ED-JHA. Thus, 
in what follows I examine the genealogy of the ED-JHA, but I insist on the competing rationales 
that shape it. Specifically, I build the genealogy of the external dimension upon the assumption 
that it has evolved from a loosely connected series of intentions, focusing on migration issues, 
to a highly embroidered policy that enlists ambitious programmes (e.g., the ENP) and 
instruments (e.g., the exchange of information, benchmarking, European Neighbourhood Policy 
instrument). 
4.1  Going external: from Edinburgh to The Hague 
The ED-JHA epitomises cooperative undertakings that aim to govern joint efforts between the 
EU and its partners, in order to alleviate threats that are ostensibly relevant to EU internal 
security. In recent years, the ENP has become the main forum within which the EU pools its 
efforts and resources with partners in order to maintain or increase social order. Yet, the ED-
JHA cannot be reduced to the ENP, however compelling this framework might be. In fact, 
securing EU internal order by working with third countries is a relatively old project, going back 
to the end of the 1980s, and has taken different forms since then. This is not to suggest that the 
EC/EU had formal competence of any kind in this domain. Indeed, the first steps in drawing 
attention to the ED-JHA were to a great extent the preserve of a community institution, without 
much ambition to enlist the aims in a coherent policy.  
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A caveat: to try and tease out all the policy initiatives having an external dimension might lead 
to a patchwork approach, an approach which, while giving the impression of 
comprehensiveness, would be dispersed and probably miss more than it claims to integrate. I 
believe such a comprehensive approach is possible, but must be focused on one sector (e.g. 
crime, drug trafficking, etc.), through which the logic of externalisation will thus be examined. 
Finally, I am confident that those who might be interested in doing just that would still find 
useful what is proposed below.  
I discuss five main developments: one, the Edinburgh European Council (1992); two, the High 
Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration – HLWG (1998); three, the Tampere European 
Council (1999); four, the Seville European Council (1999); five, the Hague Programme (2004). 
I am not claiming that these moments have the same status, nor that their insights are of equal 
interest. Instead, I argue that despite their relative importance, they merit significant attention, 
either for what they achieve or for what they make possible in the construction of the ED-JHA. 
4.1.1  The Edinburgh European Council: 1992 
Two circumstances paved the way for the Edinburgh European Council, both emphasising the 
mounting necessity to address the root causes of irregular migration. The first is the 1987 
Resolution of the European Parliament on the Right of Asylum, which calls for economic and 
political cooperation with third countries as a means to safeguard human rights and social order. 
The second is the 1991 Commission Communication on immigration. This text represents 
perhaps the first clear articulation of the EU ambition to engage external aspects of JHA, though 
limited to alleviating migration pressures. While only the 1991 Communication was taken up by 
the 1992 Edinburgh European Council, the 1987 European Parliament Resolution contributed, I 
think, to establishing an intellectual climate conducive to more focused policies.  
Most of the measures of the Edinburgh European Council are not, however, included in the 
Presidency Conclusions, as it is often the case. Instead, these are gathered in a “Declaration on 
Principles Governing External Aspects of Migration Policy”, which is appended to the 
Conclusions. In its intrinsic properties, the Edinburgh European Council is not only 
institutionally, but substantially important. The European Council met the first time since the 
Maastricht Treaty, which allowed it to intervene in the domain of foreign policy and in the 
context of JHA (Léonard, 2006, p.4). Institutionally, within the new context of a pillar structure, 
the Declaration acknowledges that EU external action in the domain of illegal migration 
depends on strong coordination among different sectors – foreign affairs, economic cooperation, 
and of course, asylum and migration – involving different actors.  
Substantially, the Edinburgh European Council combines two approaches to curb irregular 
migration, the root cause and the control approaches. The first intends to establish readmission 
agreements, i.e., a policy by which two or more states agree to readmit their own nationals or a 
third country national who transited through their country, and who do not or no longer fulfil the 
conditions for entry or stay in the territory of the requesting state. In effect, the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (TEC) provides, since its Amsterdam revision (TEC, 
Article 63.3.b), for the Community competence in adopting measures concerning the 
repatriation of illegal residents. The second aims to develop conditions which might help to 
address ‘push factors’ in the countries of origin: “the preservation of peace and the termination 
of armed conflicts; full respects for human rights; the creation of democratic societies and 
adequate social conditions; a liberal trade policy” (European Council, 1992, p.46). 
4.1.2  The High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (1998) 
The HLWG is the second constitutive moment, probably one of the most dynamics in the 
development of ED-JHA. The HLWG is a task force set up on 7 December 1998 by the Council 16 | THIERRY BALZACQ 
 
of the European Union, on a Dutch proposal. It is composed of officials from the Commission 
and representatives from member states. Ultimately, the role of the HLWG is to map transit 
points and countries of origin of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, in order to “establish a 
common, integrated, cross-pillar approach” (Bulletin EU 12-1998, JHA cooperation 5/18). The 
HLWG did not have a proper geographic focus as it aims to target any country from which, or 
through which, asylum seekers and migrants proceed to reach the territory of the EU. Thus, 
Action Plans were drawn up as regards a composite group of countries, including Afghanistan, 
Albania, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. These were then discussed at the Tampere 
European Council (1999).  
The HLWG is associated with three contextual factors that brought enormous changes to the 
ways of addressing external challenges to EU internal security. The first is the 1994 
Commission Communication on the need to establish a comprehensive approach to migration. 
The second is the mandate granted to the EU by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) to work at the 
international (i.e. systemic) level in the field of JHA. The third is consistent with the 
comprehensive approach, but sets up a ‘concentric circle’ model of migration policy. The 
Strategy Paper on Migration and Asylum Policy (1998, p.19), discussed at the Vienna European 
Council in December 1998 put it in the following terms:  
the Schengen Sates currently lay down the most intensive control measures. Their 
neighbours (essentially the associated States and perhaps also the Mediterranean area) 
should gradually be linked into a similar system which should be brought increasingly 
into line with the first circle’s standard (Schengen) particularly with regard to visa, 
border control and readmission policies. A third circle of States (CIS area, Turkey and 
North Africa) will then concentrate primarily on transit checks and combating 
facilitator networks, and a fourth circle (Middle East, China, black Africa) on 
eliminating push factors.  
Fabrizio Tassinari (2005, p. 3) maps it thus: 
Table 2. Distribution of Europe’s concentric circles 
  Countries in the Wider Europe 
Circle No. 1. EU core  Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
Circle No. 2. ‘Opt-out’ EU member states   Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, UK 
Circle No. 3. New EU member states   Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
Circle No. 4. EEA countries   Iceland, Norway, Switzerland 
Circle No. 5. Negotiating, non-negotiating 
and prospective EU candidate countries  
Bulgaria and Romania;  
Croatia and Turkey; 
Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Albania 
Circle No. 6. European neighbours   Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Russia, Ukraine  
Circle No. 7. Non-European neighbours   Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, 
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia.  
 
Thus, the key policy orientations of the HLWG are a direct product of these contextual factors. 
Léonard (2006, p.10) argues that the concentric circle approach promotes, in fact, two different 
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region and not in the other, which is difficult to uphold given the strong commonalities of issues 
that the EU has to face up to. On the one hand, a root cause model is geared towards Middle 
East and sub-Saharan Africa, while a control approach is crafted for neighbourhood countries. 
Thus, although not all ideas set out previously are amplified therein, projects to conclude 
readmission agreements with third countries and to link EU international relations to migration 
issues suggest that the HLWG is not opening up new avenues, but reinforces old policy 
orientations.  
However, the HLWG brings a radical policy shift, by proposing that substantial parts of the 
budget allocated to development aid be used to tackle migration and asylum issues. This 
constitutes one of the major vulnerabilities of proposals made by the HLWG. In fact, officials 
from the Directorate General for external relations found it ticklish to divert diplomatic means 
aimed at fostering good relationships with third countries, to different projects, whatever their 
centrality might be (e.g. the fight against illegal migration or human trafficking). Another 
vulnerability of the HLWG Action Plans is that they were not negotiated with the third countries 
concerned, which led to resistances. Thus, while the HLWG managed to set an integrated 
approach to migration, human trafficking and asylum, as a master strategy, it failed to muster 
enough support both internally and externally, leading to wobbly results.  
4.1.3  The Tampere European Council (1999) 
It is often argued that the Tampere European Council offers the first clear articulation of the 
connection between EU foreign and interior policies. We have shown that this is not entirely 
true. What is neglected, moreover, is the fact that the linkage between the two policies is 
established through the use of specific tools. The Presidency Conclusions put it thus: “The 
European Council underlines that all competences and instruments at the disposal of the Union, 
and in particular, in external relations must be used in an integrated and consistent way to build 
the area of freedom, security and justice” (Council of the European Union, 1999, point 59). But 
the relation between foreign and interior policies is not, as this quote might suggest, 
unidirectional, i.e. outside-in. It is also inside-out: “Justice and Home Affairs concerns must be 
integrated in the definition and implementation of other Union policies and activities” (Ibid.) 
To a certain extent, Tampere renews and consolidates the mandate conceded to the HLWG, in 
crafting Action Plans in order to build a more comprehensive system and increase the efficiency 
of EU policy, in the management of migration flows. Moreover, the conclusions of the 
European Council meeting insist on readmission agreements, or at least the inclusion of 
“readmission clauses in other agreements between the European Community and relevant third 
countries or group of countries.” Finally, the Tampere European Council sets out the road to 
follow: 
clear priorities, policy objectives and measures for the Union’s external action in 
Justice and Home Affairs should be defined. Specific recommendations should be 
drawn up by the Council in close co-operation with the Commission on policy 
objectives and measures for the Union’s external action in Justice and Home 
Affairs…prior to the European Council in June 2000. 
Thus, in order to put the recommendation into concrete terms, the European Council of Santa 
Maria de Feira (2000, pp. 7-8) structures the priorities in the ED-JHA around five axes:  
•  Migration policy: foster partnership with countries of origin, develop a cross-pillar approach 
to the issue…strengthen the external borders and conclude Community readmission 
agreements; 
•  The fight against organised crime and terrorism: give a key role to Europol and better 
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•  The fight against specific forms of crime (e.g. financial crime, money laundering, 
corruption, trafficking in human beings, high-tech crime, and environmental crime); 
•  The fight against drug trafficking; 
•  The development and consolidation of the rule of law in countries on the path to democracy. 
Thus, the approach laid out by the Feira European Council considerably widens the scope of the 
ED-JHA. In fact, although migration seems to remain on top of the list, other policy items are 
firmly set on the agenda (e.g. terrorism, drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering). The 
ability of the ED-JHA to generate a certain outcome, therefore, presupposes clear and frequent 
interactions among the different fields, in effect calling for a coordination mechanism between 
EU institutions. The challenge of students of EU politics is to, first, disaggregate these different 
sectors in order to explicate their inherent features and, second, to amalgamate them back in 
order to attend to the practices they generate or not. 
4.1.4  The Seville European Council (2002) 
While the debates at Feira and Tampere were more consensual, which does not by any means 
suggest that they did not raise serious practical problems, the Seville European Council was 
permeated with controversies sparked by an initiative of the Spanish Presidency and supported 
by the UK (Peers, 2004). The ambition was clear: to substantially reorganise the external 
domain of EU asylum and migration policies. Two issues drew attention, both of which had the 
ambition to alleviate the push factors underlying migration. First, the requirement made by the 
Spanish Presidency that third countries entering into relationship with the EU fulfil a predefined 
list of criteria (e.g., ratify the UN Convention on organised crime and relevant Protocols, run 
awareness campaigns, step up border controls and police operations against smugglers and 
traffickers and readmit, whenever possible, its own nationals and third country nationals having 
transited through its territory). Second, the possibility for the EU, to impose sanctions upon 
states that refuse to comply or are found to make insufficient efforts to live up to EU 
expectations. However, after long discussions, the Presidency conclusions became less 
demanding than the Spanish and British governments had wished for. They state:  
After full use has been made of existing Community mechanisms without success, the 
Council may unanimously find that a third country has shown an unjustified lack of 
cooperation in joint management of migration flows. In that event the Council may, in 
accordance with the rules laid down in the Treaties, adopt measures or positions under 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other European Union policies, while 
honouring the Union’s contractual commitments and not jeopardising development 
cooperation objectives (European Council, 2002, p.11).   
One of the immediate outputs of the Seville European Council was the 2002(703) Commission 
Communication on the integration of migration issues in the EU relations with third countries. 
Emphasis was put on the root causes of migration and the impact of migration processes on the 
EU and the countries of origin. Thus, through a surprising policy curve, we are somewhat 
brought back to the view expressed by the European Parliament Resolution in 1987. This 
surfaces in the treatment of migration, not exclusively through the control lens, as was a 
tendency in the 1990s, but also via the root cause approach which has the benefit of connecting 
migration to a wide spectrum of distinct and previously unrelated factors (e.g. development, 
conflict, state collapse and infectious disease). This view was amplified by the Hague 
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4.1.5  The Hague Programme (2004) 
The Hague programme draws a five-year policy agenda in order to develop an EU area of 
freedom, security, and justice. The programme aims to address three kinds of threat; the fight 
against terrorism, cross-border crime (e.g. human trafficking, drug smuggling) and irregular 
migration (Balzacq and Carrera, 2006, p.19). However, only irregular migration has received 
much attention within the framework of the ED-JHA. Other policies are left to the latter 
(Council of the European Union, 2004, p.30). The Hague programme organises JHA external 
activities around two pillars. On the one hand, partnerships with countries and regions of origin 
or transit help to carve out instruments that could uproot the causes and factors of irregular 
migration (e.g., capacity-building, joint resettlement programmes, poverty alleviation). On the 
other hand, return and readmission policies are regarded as necessary for the establishment of a 
credible EU area of FSJ. These policies involve not only cooperation between member states in 
the domain of expulsion of third country nationals and the development of common standards to 
implement such expulsions, but also the increasing institutionalisation of all the components of 
the ED-JHA.     
The Commission strategy (2005) on the external dimension of freedom, security and justice, fits 
the Hague programme mold. It sets out issues, principles, and instruments necessary for the 
design of an effective ED-FSJ. It is important to note that topics identified are actually a 
distillation of a number of priorities outlined by other documents (e.g. the strategic concept on 
organised crime and the EU Action Plan against terrorism). Thus, the problems that confront the 
ED-JHA include the promotion of human rights, strengthening institutions and good 
governance, border management as it relates to the control of asylum and migration, the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime. Many studies naturally focus on how these threats 
emerge (i.e. securitisation) and attempt to understand the consequences such constructions have 
on policies. By contrast, students tend not to attach much significance to the principles and 
instruments of the ED-FSJ. In my view, this is just where more work needs to be done, because 
principles and instruments are powerful indicators of both the content and rationales of a policy.  
The construction, implementation and evaluation of the ED-JHA follow a catalogue of 
principles which are meant to ensure that the policy bears fruit, with little if any indirect effect. 
Thus principles aim, primarily, to structure the development of the ED-JHA. But, contrary to 
what is often claimed, there is no explicit reference to conditionality here; instead, the 
Commission Communication emphasises socialisation, as it holds that lasting results could only 
be achieved if, at the end, partners ‘own’ EU norms and values. In addition to ownership, the 
other principles comprise geographic focus, differentiation, flexibility, cross-pillar coordination, 
relevance of external action, added value and benchmarking. At a crude level, principles 
condition the kind of instruments that are mobilised, or at least how selected instruments 
function. However, the Communication conflates instruments, policies and programmes. For 
instance, development policy is called an instrument, as well as regional cooperation. Be that as 
it may, the Communication proposes the following gamut of ‘instruments’: bilateral agreements, 
enlargement and pre-accession processes; ENP Action Plans, regional cooperation, individual 
arrangements, operational cooperation, institutional building and twinning, development policy, 
external aid programmes, international organisations and monitoring.  
In sum, the EU strategy on the ED-FSJ, despite its conceptual weakness, offers a tractable 
approach as to how the ED-FSJ should develop, in order to strengthen EU internal security and 
promote its objectives abroad. Moreover, it institutionalises the view that internal and external 
securities are intertwined. Finally, it proposes distinctive instruments that are meant to inform 
the ED-JHA. In many ways, the spirit of the Commission Communication is like that of the 
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ED-JHA. By the same token, the ENP is an attempt to substitute a comprehensive and 
coordinated scheme for a fragmented approach to the ED-JHA.  
4.2  ENP Action Plans: the JHA dimension 
The relationships between the EU and its neighbours are structured by Action Plans. I define an 
Action Plan as a commonly agreed framework (i.e., a programme) containing the list of policies 
upon which the EU and ENP partners decide to cooperate. More decisively, however, Action 
Plans condition not only what to do, but how to do it. In other words, they are both descriptive 
and prescriptive documents. The development of Action Plans follows the principle of 
differentiation, meaning that each agreement is carved out in order to meet the demands and 
expectations of each partner. This explains, if only in part, why countries belonging to the same 
region, neither enjoy the same kind of relationship with the EU nor, as a consequence, 
necessarily have the same substantive type of Action Plan. Generally, however, the fields 
around which cooperation on JHA matters is organised are similar across Action Plans, though 
they naturally vary in the level of detail aspired to. For instance, EU-Ukraine relations in the 
domain of JHA is embodied by a specific Action Plan, signed on 12
th December 2001, 
subsequently revised in 2005. It covers all the main items of EU-JHA and brings with it a 
scoreboard, which monitors the progress achieved. It could therefore be said that Ukraine has, 
as it stands, one of – if not the most – advanced programmes of cooperation with the EU in the 
field of JFS. 
In defining cooperation in the field of JHA, the ENP Action Plans usually differentiate six areas 
of action: 1. migration (legal and illegal, re-admission, visas, asylum); 2. border management; 3. 
cooperation in combating organised crime; 4. the fight against drug trafficking; 5. the fight 
against money laundering, economic and financial crimes; and 6. judicial and police 
cooperation. A closer look at Action Plans provisions on JHA suggests that cooperation is 
premised upon an effective mechanism of border management and control. In recent years, it 
has become evident that one of the lines of contention between the EU and its neighbours was 
mobility and the thorny issue of visa. Clearly, then, the challenge of the ENP is, primarily, to 
alleviate the concerns of its neighbours that the new policy will not affect their relationships 
with former allies nor lead to a stringent approach as regards free movement of persons. The 
other challenge, equally important for the EU, is to ensure that the flexibility introduced in 
border management, for instance, is fair and balanced enough to contain and deter illegal 
migration. Few, of course, will disagree that this is a tricky position to uphold. The 2006 
Commission Communication on Strengthening the ENP highlights, indeed, that: “Mobility of 
persons is of the utmost importance also for all ENP partners.” It continues by warning that: 
the Union cannot fully deliver on many aspects of the ENP if the ability to undertake 
legitimate short term travel is as constrained as it is currently. Yet our existing visa 
policies and practices often impose real difficulties and obstacles to legitimate travel 
(Commission Communication 2006/726, p. 5). 
Finally, it goes on to propose: 
this can only be addressed in the context of broader packages to address related issues 
such as cooperation on illegal immigration, in particular by sea, combating trafficking 
and smuggling in human beings, efficient border management, readmissions 
agreements and effective return of illegal migrants…. (Ibid.).  
These policies are not without problem, however. For instance, to “stem the flow of illegal 
migrants”, readmission agreements have become the main tool of EC policy (Document UE-
MA 2702/1 REV 1, 27
th July 2005). Yet, based on strong and reliable empirical works, different 
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important issues as regards the respect of human rights and dignity (see Roig and Huddleston, 
2007). Specifically, this happens in two ways, at least. On the one hand, many of the countries 
with which the EC has established readmission agreements, have notorious negative human 
rights records (e.g. Russia). Second, some states that have readmission agreements with the EC 
have set up additional agreements of the same kind, probably not of similar content or 
safeguards, with other third countries (Balzacq, 2008). For example, Ukraine has signed 
readmission agreements with various states, some of which have specific covenants with the 
EC, as diverse as Turkmenistan, Georgia, Turkey, Moldova or Vietnam. This makes the issue of 
readmission agreements particularly complex, by diluting the responsibility of the partners with 
regard to the safety of those transferred. In other words, the credibility of the ED-JHA will 
probably depend on the extent to which it complies with, and enforces, the values it claims to 
export abroad.  
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